What have we found and what have we not found in the
first 3 months of our work?
We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program
activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq
concealed from the United Nations during the
inspections that began in late 2002. The discovery of
these deliberate concealment efforts have come about
both through the admissions of Iraqi scientists and
officials concerning information they deliberately
withheld and through physical evidence of equipment
and activities that ISG has discovered that should have
been declared to the UN. Let me just give you a few
examples of these concealment efforts, some of which I
will elaborate on later:
A clandestine network of laboratories and
safehouses within the Iraqi Intelligence Service
that contained equipment subject to UN
monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW
A prison laboratory complex, possibly used in
human testing of BW agents, that Iraqi officials
working to prepare for UN inspections were
explicitly ordered not to declare to the UN.
Reference strains of biological organisms
concealed in a scientist's home, one of which can
be used to produce biological weapons.
New research on BW-applicable agents, Brucella
and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF),
and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin were
not declared to the UN.
Documents and equipment, hidden in scientists'
homes, that would have been useful in resuming
uranium enrichment by centrifuge and
electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS).
A line of UAVs not fully declared at an undeclared
production facility and an admission that they had
tested one of their declared UAVs out to a range
of 500 km, 350 km beyond the permissible limit.
Continuing covert capability to manufacture fuel
propellant useful only for prohibited SCUD variant
missiles, a capability that was maintained at least
until the end of 2001 and that cooperating Iraqi
scientists have said they were told to conceal
from the UN.
Plans and advanced design work for new
long-range missiles with ranges up to at least
1000 km - well beyond the 150 km range limit
imposed by the UN. Missiles of a 1000 km range
would have allowed Iraq to threaten targets
through out the Middle East, including Ankara,
Cairo, and Abu Dhabi.
Clandestine attempts between late-1999 and
2002 to obtain from North Korea technology
related to 1,300 km range ballistic missiles
--probably the No Dong -- 300 km range anti-ship
cruise missiles, and other prohibited military
In addition to the discovery of extensive concealment
efforts, we have been faced with a systematic
sanitization of documentary and computer evidence in a
wide range of offices, laboratories, and companies
suspected of WMD work. The pattern of these efforts to
erase evidence - hard drives destroyed, specific files
burned, equipment cleaned of all traces of use - are
ones of deliberate, rather than random, acts. For
On 10 July 2003 an ISG team exploited the
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)
Headquarters in Baghdad. The basement of the
main building contained an archive of documents
situated on well-organized rows of metal
shelving. The basement suffered no fire damage
despite the total destruction of the upper floors
from coalition air strikes. Upon arrival the
exploitation team encountered small piles of ash
where individual documents or binders of
documents were intentionally destroyed.
Computer hard drives had been deliberately destroyed. Computers would have had
financial value to a random looter; their destruction, rather than removal for resale or
reuse, indicates a targeted effort to prevent Coalition forces from gaining access to their
All IIS laboratories visited by IIS exploitation teams have been clearly sanitized, including
removal of much equipment, shredding and burning of documents, and even the removal
of nameplates from office doors.
Although much of the deliberate destruction and sanitization of documents and records
probably occurred during the height of OIF combat operations, indications of significant
continuing destruction efforts have been found after the end of major combat operations,
including entry in May 2003 of the locked gated vaults of the Ba'ath party intelligence
building in Baghdad and highly selective destruction of computer hard drives and data
storage equipment along with the burning of a small number of specific binders that
appear to have contained financial and intelligence records, and in July 2003 a site
exploitation team at the Abu Ghurayb Prison found one pile of the smoldering ashes from
documents that was still warm to the touch.