Since the power to establish voting requirements is of little value without the power to enforce those requirements, Arizona is correct that it would raise serious constitutional doubts if a federal statute precluded a State from obtaining the information necessary to enforce its voter qualifications.
9 If, but for Arizona’s interpretation ofthe “accept and use” provision, the State would be precluded from obtaining information necessary for enforcement,
we would have to determine whether Arizona’s interpretation, though plainly not the best reading, is at least a possible one. . . . Happily,we are spared that necessity, since the statute provides another means by which Arizona may obtain information needed for enforcement.
Section 1973gg–7(b)(1) of the Act provides that the Federal Form “may require only such identifying information (including the signature of the applicant) and other information (including data relating to previous registration by the applicant), as is necessary to enable the appropriate State election official to assess the eligibility of the applicant and to administer voter registration and other parts of the election process.” At oral argument, the United States expressed the view that the phrase “may require only” in §1973gg–7(b)(1) means that the EAC “shall require information that’s necessary, but may only require that information.”
. . .
Since, pursuant to the Government’s concession, a State may request that the EAC alter the Federal Form to include information the State deems necessary to determine eligibility, see §1973gg–7(a)(2); Tr. of Oral Arg. 55 (UnitedStates), and may challenge the EAC’s rejection of that request in a suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U. S. C. §701–706, no constitutional doubt is raised by giving the “accept and use” provision of the NVRA itsfairest reading. That alternative means of enforcing its constitutional power to determine voting qualifications remains open to Arizona here.